Using behavioral experiments, we examined the impact of dispensability of effort and salience of feedback on worker productivity and how they can be managed via queueing design. We considered two queue design features: queue structure that can either be parallel queues (multiple queues with a dedicated server per queue) or a single queue (a single pooled queue served by multiple providers); and queue-length visibility that can either provide full or blocked visibility. We explored the impact of these two design decisions on worker productivity. We find that 1) the parallelqueues structure speeds up the servers, which challenges the common operations wisdom regarding superiority of the single-queue structure; and 2) poor visibility of the queue length slows down the servers; however, this effect may be mitigated, or even reversed, by pay schemes that incentivize the servers for fast performance.
Introduction
In service systems, managers are constantly seeking ways to improve the customer's experience by reducing service waiting times. Service windows, such as those at banks, post offices, motor vehicle offices, and delicatessens, are known for single-queue structures (a single pooled queue served by multiple providers). Retail companies such as TJ Maxx, Hannaford, and Target have implemented or experimented with a single-queue, "next available" checkout policy with varying degrees of success (Hauss, 2008; Helms, 2011; Fantasia, 2009 ). This design choice is supported by queueing theory: It is well known from analytical models that a single queue (a.k.a., common or pooled queue) with a total of s available servers leads to lower average waiting times compared to the set of s identical servers operating in parallel (a.k.a., multiple, dedicated, or separate queues) (Smith and Whitt, 1981) . Nevertheless, parallel queues are still common practice for many service environments in which servers have face-to-face contact with customers and with other servers (e.g., retail stores, ticket booths, security gates, fast food restaurants, etc.). Similarly, direct job assignments can be found in service systems where the servers have no direct contact with either customers or other servers (e.g., technical support centers pre-assign tickets to specific agents), effectively creating a parallel-queues policy, so it is still critical to consider both queue structures when studying worker productivity. Bendoly et al. (2010) suggest that worker productivity is impacted by various behavioral factors.
They point out the need for rigorous research on several research questions, including: (1) Given that a single queue has higher and more obvious task interdependence, which is known to reduce effort, does this dispensability of effort affect speed (i.e., social loafing theory); and (2) Given that there is higher-quality feedback and a more direct relationship with customers in parallel than in single queues, does this salient feedback affect server speed (i.e., control theory)?
In this study we focused on two aspects of queue design that impact dispensability of effort and salient feedback : queue structure and queue-length visibility. Queue structure is represented by single-queue and parallel-queues environments. Queue-length visibility (hereafter "queue visibility") is represented by the availability of feedback about the length of the queue.
Based on prior research, parallel queues have both higher feedback and lower perceived interdependence and, therefore, should induce higher effort than the single queue, with low feedback and high interdependence (Bendoly et al., 2010) . However, directly comparing these two systems does not allow us to separate the effects of feedback from dispensability of effort. Therefore, we also study these systems when both have low feedback to determine the marginal impact of feedback compared to interdependence. Any performance difference observed between single-and parallelqueues structures under equally poor feedback would indicate that workers are affected by the dispensability of their effort. Meanwhile, the relative change from this baseline when comparing the two structures under full visibility would be the marginal impact of salient feedback. In order to isolate the variables of interest and reduce the potential variability inherent to real-world experiments, we perform experiments in controlled, simulated environments, in which subjects work with computerized co-workers to face a computer-generated stream of customers in a grocery-store cashier setting.
Queue visibility provides a tool to manipulate feedback to test control theory. Moreover, the issue of visibility is also a real-world concern for queues. We spoke with managers at a ticketing booth for athletic events about queue-design choices and observed the dynamics of the queues at the booth (which we tested in both parallel-and single-queue structures in a pilot study for a related field experiment). Based on these observations, we find the following challenge of physical queue design: The physical structure of the queue environment may block visibility of longer queues due to high barriers-e.g., queues that extend behind walls or fences-or due to the position of the service provider relative to the queue, resulting in partial (or blocked) visibility.
For example, as Figure 1 illustrates, the arrangement of the single queue may impact the amount of feedback that servers receive through visibility of the queue length. In Figure 1 Similarly, in the parallel-queues system, as illustrated in Figure 2 , the presence of high merchandise display stands (represented by bold, thick lines on the diagram) next to the cashiers' terminals can block the visibility of the queue. Removing these objects may improve visibility of the queue length. Blocked visibility decreases availability of feedback and, consequently, may impact workers' performance. Based on research by Schultz et al. (1998) , who find that workers in a serial task speed up or slow down when they can better measure the amount of work to be done, feedback quality or the lack of feedback could influence server motivation. Understanding the effect of visibility on worker speed provides valuable feedback for the physical design of the service area. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the impact of queue structure and queue visibility on servers' behavior and providing important managerial insights for designing queueing systems. Our findings are rigorous in several ways: 1) We focus on nondiscretionary tasks-i.e., tasks in which the servers do not have discretion in the number and quality of activities to perform for the customer. We focus on a nondiscretionary task because it removes the trade-off between service quality and speed (Hopp et al., 2007; Wickelgren, 1977; Anand et al., 2011) . Examples of nondiscretionary tasks include processing a shopping cart or ticket purchase; collecting money at toll booths; and other tasks that have structured procedures for completion. 2) We fix the average arrival rate within each treatment in order to stabilize the load because load can affect servers' behavior (Delasay et al., 2015) , and we want to minimize this effect; we then perform a robustness check with a lowered average arrival rate and confirm that our results are still present. 3)
We automate co-workers to standardize or reduce social biases from interpersonal group dynamics (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010; Schultz et al., 2010) while still allowing for the effects of an interdependent task. Thus, we isolate the two behavioral factors-dispensability of effort (controlled by queue structure) and saliency of feedback (controlled by both queue structure and queue visibility)-so that we may consider their role in servers' performance.
Our results challenge the commonly accepted wisdom that pooling is beneficial in terms of minimizing average wait time. We find that servers work faster in a parallel-queues environment than in a single-queue system, which may reverse this result. Motivated by our result, Do et al. (2015) find an analytical threshold that shows how much the servers should speed up in the parallelqueues structure in order to outperform the single-queue structure. We also find that poor queue visibility slows down the servers in both structures; however, this result may be mitigated or reversed by incentive schemes: for example, under fixed compensation, the servers slow down under poor visibility; however, under pay-for-performance, the servers' speed in a single-queue setting may increase due to hindered visibility. In addition, providing incentives in a poor-visibility setting mitigates the speed-up caused by the parallel-queues structure.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the relevant literature and develop our hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe our experimental design. In Section 4, we provide summary of our data, including visual representations of the data. In Section 5, we present our data analysis and results, and finally, we conclude and provide important managerial insights in Section 6.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
A number of previous studies have shown that servers are strategic and can adjust their service rate in response to the environment, rather than working at a constant known rate (as early analytical work assumed). This includes reacting to the type of task, the work load, and the pay structure.
Analytical work finds that the value of queue pooling is reduced with strategic servers, particularly when servers have discretion over the number or quality of tasks to perform for a given customer (i.e., discretionary tasks) (Cachon and Zhang, 2007; Jouini et al., 2008; Debo et al., 2008; Hopp et al., 2007 Hopp et al., , 2009 . Behavioral studies have shown that when tasks are discretionary, workers will speed up or slow down to appear busy or keep up with a higher load as necessary, particularly to meet external incentives (Tan and Netessine, 2014; Oliva and Sterman, 2001; Hasija et al., 2010) .
While discretion is an interesting factor, our study was concerned primarily with the impact of the queue design on server performance. Therefore, to minimize the effect of discretion, we chose to focus on nondiscretionary tasks, which are very common in practice (checking out customers in a grocery setting, selling tickets, processing registration information, etc). Additionally, Joustra et al. (2010) show analytically that pooling is ineffective when merging distinct customer types, so all of our customers have comparable carts. In an analytical study on compensation and workload allocation, Gilbert and Weng (1998) find reduced benefit in pooling when two competing symmetric employees set a costly effort level, are compensated per customer, and compete with other servers for tasks. In our behavioral work, we also explore the effect of compensation on effort and the resulting benefits of pooling. We find that per-cart compensation increases effort in both queue structures, but particularly under reduced visibility, when servers may assume that they are competing for limited customers. Finally, in studying environmental factors that affect server speed, previous studies find that load can affect speed under a particular set of queue-design parameters (see Delasay et al. 2015 for a detailed summary). We set the queue parameters so that all subjects in a treatment face similar average arrival rates, and we tested our study under both high and low load.
Working in groups changes the perception of output relative to effort. Williams et al. (1981) and Karau and Williams (1993) define social loafing as the reduction in individual effort exerted by workers in a group setting as opposed to an individual setting, and they summarize several theories that have been proposed to explain the phenomenon. We focus on one theory that argues that social loafing is driven by dispensability of effort, which occurs when individuals feel that their input is marginal to the group's output. Note that dispensability of effort is present regardless of the visibility of the other servers; and it may be present regardless of whether the workload is shared with a human server, a machine, or a virtual co-worker because it is about the shared effort across the number of co-workers, not social pressure (Mas and Moretti, 2009 ). In a parallel-queues system, servers have their own queues, and their performance has a direct impact on the speed at which the line is moving. Moreover, the servers face every customer who joins their queue. If customers join the shortest queue, each server also influences the total workload of other servers, but servers are likely to view their queue as their responsibility. In contrast, in the single-queue environment, servers work together to process one common queue, and, thus, the impact of each individual's effort is less apparent. The workload under the single-queue system is visibly interdependent and is likely to lead to lower server effort (Bendoly et al., 2010) . In both approaches, the work is collective, in that the final goal of processing all incoming customers is jointly managed by all workers together, allowing for social loafing. However, the interdependence makes the collective nature more clear in the single-queue than in the parallel-queues system (Karau and Williams, 1993 ).
While we are interested in the structural drivers of social loafing, there are other interpersonal drivers of social loafing that arise from social and strategic interactions between human co-workers.
Such interactions have been addressed by, for example, Mas and Moretti (2009) , who find that a worker's productivity improves when a highly productive employee is introduced into a group of parallel-queues workers. This occurs when there is a previous relationship, and the workers know that the faster employee can see them. Similar results show that workers are affected by peer relationships within their teams, such as friendships and enmities (Bandiera et al., 2010) . Several studies show that individuals will converge to the average-such that fast workers slow down and slow workers speed up-a pattern known as equity theory (Schultz et al., 1998 (Schultz et al., , 1999 (Schultz et al., , 2010 . Most of these studies are done in conjunctive (serial) tasks in which one subject's output depends on another upstream teammate's output. Schultz et al. (2010) present evidence supporting equity theory in an additive task with a common buffer, which is similar to a single-queue setting. In our study, in order to focus on queue structure and queue visibility rather than on peer effects, we automated the co-workers and equalized co-worker processing rates, eliminating the effects of prior relationships and standardizing relative speed.
Other inter-personal moderators of social loafing focus on the individual level. Köhler (1927) finds that some workers exert greater effort in small-group settings due to peer pressure,as opposed to the free riding that can occur within a large group of co-workers. Similarly, Karau and Williams (1993) find that a variety of factors moderate the degree to which individual workers will exhibit social loafing (e.g., culture, evaluation potential, expectations of co-worker's performance, etc.).
We chose to focus our current analysis on the overall directional effect of behavioral factors across the average population, rather than analyzing the data at the individual level.
Additional interpersonal issues are tied to the physical structure and design of the queue and do affect our subjects: dehumanization of teammates via lack of physical presence (Alnuaimi et al., 2010) ; framing of bonuses (Hossain and List, 2012) ; and group versus individual performance-based pay (Siemsen et al., 2007) . In our study, all subjects had the same degree of physical separation from their computerized co-workers, and all payments occurred at the end to standardize these two biases.
The issue of incentives and motivation is of concern to managers, and, thus, we investigate two compensation mechanisms-fixed pay and performance-based pay-the two extremes of individual payment incentives, leaving out the group-performance-based pay.
Separate from social loafing, control theory, discussed in the behavioral literature, tells us that workers use feedback about their actual performance relative to a goal to self-regulate behavior (Donovan, 2001; Bendoly et al., 2010) . Schultz et al. (2003) and Powell and Schultz (2004) find that workers adjust their speeds more when feedback about performance becomes more salient, such as when low-inventory buffers allow observation of fast and slow points in a production line.
These studies focus on serial systems in which workers depend on their upstream teammate, the results of which do not directly translate to the parallel-or single-queue settings in our study but do motivate our research.
Our research is most closely related to the empirical work of Song et al. (2013) and Wang and Zhou (2015) . Song et al. (2013) examine the impact of queue pooling in a healthcare setting. They find that patient length-of-stay is ten-percent shorter when physicians are assigned patients under a parallel (dedicated-queue) system, compared to when the physicians work together under a pooled (single-queue) system. This indicates that workers slow down when working with a pooled queue as opposed to a dedicated queue. The healthcare environment, however, has highly variable customer care requirements that are further compounded by the nature of discretionary task completion, meaning that service providers have discretion over the number of tasks to perform for a given patient. Wang and Zhou (2015) study parallel queues and single queues running simultaneously in a grocery store and find empirical evidence that workers slow down in pooled queues and speed up with longer customer queues. These results support our hypotheses-listed below-in complex empirical settings. Our study contributes to this literature, as we tested our hypotheses through a controlled laboratory experiment, which allowed us to better isolate and separate the drivers behind the servers' slowdown: dispensability of effort and feedback availability. In addition, we manipulated pay structure and system utilization to obtain robust results and additional insights.
Combined, the dispensability of effort from social-loafing theory and the non-salience of feedback from control theory indicate that the system with a single queue may lead to worse per-server performance thanon with parallel queues (Bendoly et al., 2010) . Additionally, we manipulated feedback separately from queue structure to study the marginal impact of each behavioral driver. Based on these observations, we formed our hypotheses regarding queue structure and queue visibility.
Hypothesis 1 (Impact of queue structure) Servers work faster in the queueing environment in which customers are aligned into multiple parallel queues instead of a single pooled queue.
Hypothesis 2 (Impact of queue visibility) Servers work more slowly in a queueing environment with blocked (poor) queue-length visibility than in an environment with full (good) visibility.
Experimental Design
To test our hypotheses, we created a computer-simulated retail environment. Subjects participated in the experiment by playing the role of a cashier whose task is to process the shopping carts of incoming customers. The subjects worked as a part of a group of four cashiers in which the three other cashiers were computer-simulated. Each customer arriving for service brought a cart containing five grocery items with different prices, ranging from $1 to $5 in whole units (see Figure   3 ).
The subjects' task was to move each of five sliders to a value corresponding to the price of each grocery item and then to click the "Submit Cart" button. Sliders have been used in past research and are considered real-effort tasks (Gill and Prowse, 2011) . These five sliders corresponded to the five items in the cart and moved in increments of $0.10 from $0 to $6; this range ensured that the extreme values of price were not at the end of the slider, and, thus, all item prices were similarly difficult to set correctly. By design, all the grocery items had different prices, so that the subjects could not use the position of one slider as a reference point for aligning the adjacent slider. The permutations of prices were pre-generated randomly, and each subject faced the same set of carts.
The simulator did not let subjects process carts inaccurately: the "Submit Cart" button became active only when all the prices were set correctly. We recorded the time between customer arrival and the clicking of the Submit Cart button, which gave us an estimate of service time. All the other cashiers were computerized and served customers according to a pre-programmed process. Their service time for each customer was a random time set to ten seconds plus an exponential random variable with a mean of ten seconds. We selected this distribution after examining data from our pilot studies, in which we measured the subjects' service time (the plot of service time distribution from the pilot data is presented in Figure 8 in the Appendix, Section 7.3). Computersimulated customers arrived for service according to a Poisson process with a mean inter-arrival time of 5.5 seconds. In the single-queue treatment, arriving customers joined the single queue;
in the parallel-queues treatment, arriving customers observed the system and joined the shortest queue with ties broken randomly. Customer jockeying is an important attribute of many real-world queues; however, because we did not have a well-developed model for customer jockeying behavior and because our main focus was on the server behavior, we omitted this aspect from the current study. Note that while customers already in the system did not jockey between the queues, the arriving customers always joined the shortest queue; this led to a distribution of customers that was fairly balanced among the queues during the experiment (see Figure 12 , which shows the distribution of queue length assuming jockeying, next to the distribution of queue length assuming that customers join the shortest queue, as implemented in our study). Hence, we assumed that adding jockeying would not make a large change to the balance of load among the queues. The simulator was initialized with customers already present in the queue to make sure that the subjects could immediately start working and that the system would achieve steady state relatively quickly (in the single-queue setting: one customer at each server and eight customers in the queue;
in the parallel-queues setting: one customer at each server and three customers in each queue). To calibrate the parameters (set arrival rate, set the service rate of computerized servers, and set the initial queue length parameters), we simulated our experiment with different values and visually assessed the evolution of average queue length and average utilization in the system observed during the ten-minute experimental round; we then chose the values for which each system achieved the steady state as fast as possible (as evidenced by the plots in Figure 4 ) and for which the different queue structures had similar utilization (as evidenced by the plots of the average server's utilization in Figure 11 in the Appendix). Server's rates of the three computer servers are fixed at ten plus an exponential random variable with a mean of ten. The Rate of the fourth server is varied, assuming the same additive structure, to investigate the possible effect of the human server with different service speed on the queue length. For example, the rate of 16 in this figure corresponds to ten plus an exponential random variable with a mean of six. Customers arrived according to an exponential random variable with a mean of 5.5. Single -single (pooled) queue.
Single queue was initialized with one customer at each server and eight customers in the pooled queue. The queue-length variable for the single queue measures number of customers in the pooled queue. Parallelparallel queues. Parallel queues started with one customer at each server and three customers in each queue. The queue-length variable for the parallel queue measures the average number of customers in the line in front of the simulated behavioral agent.
Subject pools
We conducted our experiments on two populations. For the first population, we conducted our experiment in the behavioral lab at a large private university in the Northeastern United States. For the second population, we ran the experiment online, using Amazon Mechanical Turk, henceforth referred to as M-Turk. M-Turk is well supported as a subject pool in social-science experiments, particularly for tasks with limited expertise requirements (Berinsky et al., 2012; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Rand, 2012; Goodman et al., 2012; Paolacci et al., 2010) . For example, Paolacci et al. (2010) compare the results of M-Turk workers to those of traditional lab-recruitment subjects across several studies and show that "[w]orkers in Mechanical Turk exhibit the classic heuristics and biases and pay attention to directions at least as much as subjects from traditional sources" (p. 417), indicating that M-Turk is a comparable and reliable source of experimental subject recruitment when compared to undergraduate lab-based recruitment.
Each population had its benefit: In the lab setting, we got a relatively homogeneous population and expected less noise associated with a difference in working conditions (type of equipment,
Internet connection, etc.). In the M-Turk setting, we had access to a relatively heterogeneous population that had a smaller "experimenter effect" (Paolacci et al., 2010) and was known to have a lower incidence of compensatory equalization or demoralization (Horton et al., 2011) . Further, the incentive of M-Turk subjects to complete the experiment, particularly for the flat-pay incentive scheme, is closer to the real-world workers' incentive in many practical settings. Specifically, subjects may be worried about their reputation and ability to get future jobs because they may be affected by the low rankings left on M-Turk by the experimenter.
Experimental flow
The experiment proceeded in the same manner for both populations. First, all subjects completed a series of screens with instructions that provided a description of the experimental environment and task, as well as a visual example of the experiment (see Section 7.1 in the Appendix for a complete set of instructions). Each subject then completed a two-minute training session to become familiar with the interface and sliders. After this training, the subjects completed a ten-minute round of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, the subjects completed an exit survey with which we collected demographic information, information regarding subjects' managerial experience, and, for the M-Turk population, information on the type of input device (external mouse, mousepad, touch screen) the subjects used to move the sliders. Finally, the subjects received payment. Each subject was allowed to participate in the experiment only once.
Incentive settings
To capture different practical settings, we ran the experiments under two different incentive settings:
Flat Pay, by which all subjects received a fixed payment for completing the experiment regardless of their performance (e.g., student employees at a university athletics ticketing booth who receive a fixed hourly wage) and Per Cart, by which subjects received a small fixed pay and a bonus per each completed cart (e.g., cashiers at a retail store that provides incentives based on items scanned per minute). We explained the Per Cart payment scheme to the participants in the following way: "You will earn $0.25 ($0.04 on M-Turk) for each customer that you successfully submit. Thus, if you complete ten customers, you will earn $2.50 ($0.40) in addition to the $2.00 ($0.50) participation payment." Then, we checked that the subjects understood the payment scheme by having them compute the payoff for a sample scenario and, in case of a wrong answer, repeating the instructions and having them compute the payoff again until they answered correctly.
The subjects in the M-Turk population were paid $1.25 for participation in the 30-minute experiment regardless of their performance in the Flat Pay setting, and a fixed fee of $0.50 in the Per Cart setting plus $0.04 per each completed cart, with an average total payoff of $1.47. 1
The subjects in the lab population were paid $5.00 for participation in the 30-minute experiment regardless of their performance in the Flat Pay setting, and a fixed fee of $2.00 in the Per Cart setting plus $0.25 per each completed cart, with an average payoff of $9.65.
Experimental treatments
We differentiate between two types of factors involved in our study: the main experimental factors that impacted the actual design of the system; and factors that allowed us to address heterogeneous practical settings. All the factors are summarized in We had two main experimental factors that impacted the design of the queueing system and that directly address Hypotheses 1 and 2: Factor 1 -Queue Structure with two levels: Single Queue and Parallel Queues and Factor 2 -Queue Visibility with two levels: Full Visibility and Blocked Visibility. The difference between these treatments in our study was reflected in the visual representation of the queueing environment in the computer-simulated store. Given the main factors outlined above, we had four different visual representations of the system. In addition to the two factors that impacted the design of the queueing systems, we included two factors that helped us assess the behavioral impacts of Factors 1 and 2 in heterogeneous environments. Factor 3 -Incentive Setting captured various practical payment schemes that are observed in retail and service environments: the Flat Pay incentive setting covers scenarios in which employees get paid a fixed wage regardless of their performance; the Per Cart incentive setting covers scenarios in which employees get incentives based on their performance (in our implementation, subjects got a bonus per each completed cart). Finally, Factor 4 -Subject Population with two levels (Lab and M-Turk) allowed us to test our hypotheses on a heterogeneous population. To sum up, we had a 2x2 design of the main experimental factors within a 2x2 framework of incentive setting and population combinations for a total of 16 experimental cells.
Participants
For the lab experiment, we recruited 248 subjects at a large public university in Northeastern U.S.:
46.0% of the subjects were female, 53.6% male, and the rest did not disclose their gender. Their ages ranged from 19 to 49, with a mean of 21.7 and a median of 21.
For the online experiment, we recruited subjects on M-Turk from the pool of U.S.-based workers with at least 70% positive feedback and 50 successfully completed prior tasks to ensure relatively experienced computer users. From the total of 481 unique subjects who completed the experiments on M-Turk, 54.3% were female, 44.4% male, and the rest did not disclose their gender. Their ages ranged from 19 to 51, with a mean of 34.1 and a median of 33.
Data Description
We obtained 729 unique and complete observations across all treatments. The 729 observations are broken down by treatments and summarized in Table 2 . We checked the results for unique user identification codes (both lab and M-Turk) and unique IP addresses (M-Turk) and eliminated any duplicates. Therefore, our reported observations do not include three lab subjects and seven M-Turk subjects that completed the study twice (20 total observations). Table 2 : Count of observations used in analysis.
For each subject, we collected data on all completed carts during the ten-minute round. However, for further analysis, we wanted to use only data from the time period when each subject was past her learning curve and when the queueing system was in steady state, which, according to our simulation plots (Figure 4 ), was achieved around the halfway point of the experiment. Hence, for each user, we took the subset of carts that were completed in the second half of the experiment.
The beginning of the second half of the experiment for each user was approximated by the cart number that followed the quotient of the division of the total number of completed carts by two.
We then calculated the Median Service Time and the Variance of Service Time over the selected subset of carts for each user. In the Appendix, we also provide our results using the Average Service Time measure computed over both the second half of carts and all submitted carts to demonstrate that the results are similar (see Section 7.4, Table 9 ).
We began our analysis by comparing the distributions of the Median Service Time in Figure 5 , which let us assess the effect of our factors on the servers' speed over the whole domain. indicating that the distribution in the parallel-queues treatment is stochastically smaller, and the subjects are working faster in the Parallel Queues setting. This observation is consistent with our intuition about Hypothesis 1. While the ordering of distributions stays consistent over the whole domain, the size of the difference between the cumulative probability curves varies with the distribution percentile. For example, in the comparison for queue structure, the difference between the curves at the 25 th percentile is smaller than the effect at the 50 th and 75 th percentiles, indicating that the effect is smaller for the faster servers than it is for the slower servers.
Second, when examining the comparison of distributions for different levels of queue visibility, we notice that while the Full Visibility curve is to the left of Blocked Visibility, the difference between the curves is very small. While the direction is consistent with our intuition regarding Hypothesis 2, it is not clear whether the difference is significant. This may be due to the fact that we aggregated data across all other factors in these distribution plots. We will look at the disaggregated data below.
We also observe that compensating the subjects per completed cart made the subjects work faster, as evidenced by the difference between the curves for Per Cart and Flat Pay treatments. This is intuitive, as subjects were trying to earn a higher payoff, and is consistent with Gilbert and Weng (1998) . Finally, subjects worked faster in the lab environment than on M-Turk, which is, again, intuitive, as the subjects in the lab are "working" in a minimal-distraction environment and were focused on a single task. Moreover, there may have been a more prominent "experimenter effect" in the lab environment, which could have provided an intrinsic incentive to work faster, consistent with Horton et al. (2011) . Next, we present the disaggregated box plots of our data to assess potential interaction effects. plots allow us to look at potential interaction effects between different treatments. We make several interesting observations:
1. The effect of queue structure seems smaller overall in Per Cart incentive setting than under Flat Pay setting. This behavior is intuitively understood since subjects had an incentive to process as many carts as possible regardless of the queue structure.
2. The Median Service Time under the Parallel Queues structure looks consistently lower than the Median Service Time under the Single Queue structure in all four cells that have Full Visibility; however, under Blocked Visibility, the impact of the queue structure is less pronounced, indicating that there may have been an interaction effect between the queue structure and queue visibility factors.
3. The impact of Full Visibility is greater in the Lab setting than on M-Turk, which may been due to the fact that subjects paid more attention to the experiment in the controlled, lessdistracted environment.
These observations provide us with initial intuition and direction. We now switch to a statistical analysis of our data to rigorously test our hypotheses and to quantify the results.
Data Analysis
We performed our analysis in several steps. First, in Section 5.1, we look for support of our hypotheses by comparing the 50 th percentiles of the Median Service Time under different treatments.
Since distribution plots presented above ( Figure 5 ) hint at potential differences in the comparisons of the tail behavior, we performed the same tests to compare the 25 th and 75 th percentiles of the Median Service Time. Next, in Section 5.2, we compare the Variance of Service Time per subject across treatments to study whether our factors had impact on the variability of each subject's performance. Finally, in Section 5.3, we report results of our regression analysis, which combined all factors and included control variables.
To capture potential interaction effects, we performed the tests separately for every combination of the other three factors. For example, to address Hypothesis 1, we performed eight comparisons for each combination of Factors 2, 3, and 4.
Upon examination of Q-Q plots of our data (Figure 9 in Section 7.3 of the Appendix), we found that the disaggregated data did not satisfy the normality assumption, and, hence, rather than using standard analysis techniques, such as ANOVA, we performed non-parametric permutation tests in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. These tests do not rely on any assumptions regarding the underlying distributions of data (Good, 2013) . In the permutation test, we permuted the observation from the original data and constructed a distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis; we then used this distribution to test where the original test statistic lies.
Analysis of Median Service Time
We compared the 25 th , 50 th , and 75 th percentiles of the Median Service Time between treatments to find statistical support for our hypotheses. In Table 3 , for each of the 16 treatment cells, we report the 50 th percentile of the Median Service Time with standard error in parentheses. We performed non-parametric permutation tests to check for the differences in 50 th percentiles between treatments as described above, and reported the direction and its significance. Regarding queue structure, we find strong support for Hypothesis 1 in the Flat incentive setting: we observe statistically significant lower service time (indicating a faster service rate) in the Parallel Queues than in the Single Queue structure for both queue length visibility levels and both populations. In the Per Cart setting, interestingly, we observe a different behavior: the difference in service time between Parallel Queue and Single Queue structures is significant under Full Visibility, but not significant under Blocked Visibility. In this case, it appears that feedback was the primary driver of any differences under this pay structure. It is, indeed, reasonable that dispensability of effort had less (or no) impact in this incentivized setting since the subjects were compensated for their effort. Focusing on the Full Visibility setting, we conclude that the slowdown is present in the Single Queue structure under Full Visibility regardless of the pay structure.
Regarding queue visibility, we find strong support for Hypothesis 2, again in the Flat incentive setting: we observe statistically significant higher service time (indicating a lower service rate) in the Blocked Visibility than in the Full Visibility setting for both queue structure levels and both populations. In Single Queue, poor feedback exacerbated the already low feedback, but we also find Parallel Queue performance decline as the feedback decreased. Thus, we can conclude that poor feedback reduced the effort level in the Flat Pay treatment. In the Per Cart setting, manipulating visibility had a similar statistically significant impact on speed in the Parallel Queues structure.
Results in the Per Cart incentive setting with Single Queue deserve special attention: we observe that the effect of visibility went in the opposite direction than predicted by Hypothesis 2. Namely, Blocked Visibility sped up the servers. This may be explained as follows: In the presence of per cart incentives, the subjects tried to complete as many carts as possible. Without knowledge of how many potential customers were present, the subjects tried to work as fast as possible to "steal" as many customers as possible from the other servers, consistent with Gilbert and Weng (1998) .
Next, we performed a similar analysis for 25 th and 75 th percentiles of the median service time distribution to assess whether our observations hold for slower/faster subjects. The results are presented in Table 4 . In the Flat incentive setting, we observe similar results across all percentiles: subjects' median service speeds were faster under the Parallel Queues structure and lower under Blocked Visibility.
In the Per Cart incentive setting, the difference between queue structure was significant only under Full Visibility, which is consistent with the earlier observation about the 50 th percentile. Finally, we note that in the Per Cart incentive setting, queue visibility had weaker (or no) effect for some combinations, and, moreover, the result in the Single Queue setting where Blocked Visibility sped up the servers is not observed for slow servers (75 th percentile). One potential explanation for this change at the sub-group level may be that the "slow workers" group did not have many motivated people. However, understanding the individual factors that led to this difference in behavior between sub-groups requires future research.
Analysis of Variance of Service Time per Subject
In addition to studying the difference in Median Service Times, we analyzed the difference in
Variance of Service Times per subject. As the queue design and/or incentive setting changed in the queueing system, we observed the changes in medians as indicated in Section 5.1; however, if such manipulations to the queueing system increased variability of service time, this increase may have negated (or even counterweighted) the benefit obtained by the decrease in median service time, making the system performance worse. Hence, we want to understand the changes in variance.
Similar to the approach used for the Median Service Times comparisons, we performed the nonparametric permutation tests to compare the means of Variance of Service Time under different treatments and report the test results in Table 5 . First, we note that the variances were higher in the M-Turk population than in the Lab: This is intuitive, as the subjects were more focused on their task in the Lab environment and had potentially fewer distractions than in the M-Turk environment. We also observe that for all treatments within either population, there were no notable differences between the variances under different treatments, indicating that while changes to the queueing design shifted the distribution of service time, as evidenced in Section 5.1, they did not affect the variability of service time.
Regression Analysis
Finally, we performed regression analysis to capture the joint impact of Queue Style, Queue Visibility, and Incentive Setting, and to control for other factors that could potentially have impacted our results. Since control variables and the variances were different in the Lab and M-Turk populations, we performed the regression separately for each population. We defined the variables used in specifying the regression models in Table 6 . We now specify the model with all interaction effects (β jI is a vector of coefficients associated with interaction effects for population j ∈ {L, M } indicating Lab or M-Turk, and X contains interaction terms) and control variables (β jC is a vector of coefficients associated with control effects for population j ∈ {L, M } and C j contains all control variables) for the following regression analysis.
C L consists of gender (binary indicator with 1 representing male subjects), age (binary indicator with 1 representing subjects born after 1990), and managerial experience (binary indicator with 1 representing having managerial experience). In the M-Turk population, there was heterogeneity in the devices used to complete the experiment. Thus, in addition to the controls in C L , we controlled for the device type, distinguishing among external mouse, mouse-pad, and touchscreen.
We excluded seven subjects who did not provide answers to all the questions that addressed our control variables.
For each population j ∈ {L, M }, the regression model was:
As evidenced by the box plots of our data (Figure 6 ), there were multiple outliers, which skewed the distribution and violated the assumption of normality. Therefore, we used the robust regression approach and found MM-estimators using the robustbase package in R. This robust regression approach finds estimators that minimize the influence function, which captures the joint impact of residuals (see Yohai (1987) for details). We summarize regression results for the model in Equation 1 in Visibility with Flat incentive setting, we observe a statistically significant service time decrease (corresponding to a service rate increase) due to Parallel Queues structure and service time increase (corresponding to a service rate decrease) due to Blocked Visibility. Moreover, we observe a significant interaction effect between incentives and visibility, indicating that providing the incentive for performance is significant for increasing service speed only under blocked visibility. In addition, we observe that several control variables played an important role in determining the service speed in the experiment: for example, younger subjects and male subjects worked faster, and subjects working with a mouse pad or touch screen instead of an external mouse worked more slowly.
Robustness Check: Low Load
Recent research demonstrates that service speed is impacted by the load (or the queue length) of the system (e.g., KC and Terwiesch (2012) ). Within the scope of our research questions, it is interesting to see whether the effect of behavioral factors was impacted by the load and whether our results still hold if the server had plenty of idle time and, hence, frequently stopped/resumed and observed the system empty. To test for this, we ran additional experiments with a lower average arrival rate, which resulted in a lower average queue length and lower utilization for workers (see Figure 11 in the Appendix).
We again recruited subjects on M-Turk from the pool of U.S.-based workers with at least 70% positive feedback and 50 successfully completed prior tasks to ensure relatively experienced computer users. From the total of 487 unique subjects who completed the experiments on M-Turk, 48.3% were male, 51.7% were female, and the rest did not disclose their gender. Their ages ranged from 19 to 51, with a mean of 33.3 and a median of 31. Low load reduced the impact of the queue design variables that we studied. Under low load, the utilization was lower (about 80%; see Figure 11 in the Appendix for details), indicating that the subjects observed the system without any customers in the queue more frequently than in the high load setting. When the subjects observed other servers being idle, they knew that there were no customers waiting in the system regardless of the Visibility setting. Hence, we expected the effect of visibility to become less pronounced in a low load setting. Similarly, we expected the effect of queue structure to be lower under low load since the two systems appeared similar to the subjects when the waiting area was empty (which happened more frequently under the low load). Moreover, when the subject was serving a customer in an empty system, the effect of task interdependence was removed; thus, the dispensability of effort was low. Indeed, we observed that the effect was less pronounced under low load; however, the effects of speed-up due to parallel queues structure and slowdown due to blocked visibility were still present, and are consistent with the results under high load.
Conclusion
The results of our study indicate that the physical layout of the service environment can influence worker effort and, hence, the system's overall performance. Specifically, the median service rate is reduced under highly interdependent outcomes (single-queue setting) and even more so under low feedback (blocked visibility of the queue length(s)). Management can potentially control both of these physical design features regarding queue structure and queue visibility. While providing incentives for fast performance seems like a straightforward mitigation tool, our results show that 1) the workers' slowdown effect due to queue structure in the presence of good feedback (Full Visibility) is not mitigated by Per Cart incentives; and 2) incentives can reverse the effect of good feedback (Full Visibility) in a single-queue structure. This presents an important managerial insight that pay-for-performance incentives have different impacts in different queue designs.
We also note, with regard to management, that while traditional queueing theory would endorse moving to a single-queue system, servers work more slowly in this setting, diluting the benefits predicted by the theoretical models. Managers moving to single-queue settings may overestimate the improvement in speed and, therefore, under-staff and fail to meet service goals. At the same time, we note that in systems without pay-for-performance incentives, managers looking to increase worker speed without having to reconfigure their existing queueing layout should consider increasing the servers' feedback about queue length. Feedback can come from adjusting the physical layout of the queue to reduce visibility barriers (e.g., lowering the height of display cases) or adding visibility enhancements (e.g., mirrors or video displays of the line or electronic displays of customer movement within the store). In the systems that pay the workers for performance, however, improved feedback may have a negative effect on performance.
Across the literature on worker behavior and queueing theory, we have explored the separate effects of feedback and task interdependence as drivers of performance for parallel and single queues.
These findings add to the body of work on the impact of work environment on employees' behavior.
More specifically, within the queueing theory literature, we consider non-discretionary tasks across environmental factors. To isolate feedback and interdependence as the variables of interests, we have controlled for many additional factors, including group size, interpersonal dynamics, cart complexities, and relative speed of co-workers. Adding these real-world complexities back in through future research would further enrich the understanding of how output and performance are driven by the physical and personal design of work teams.
Finally, the impact of this worker slowdown requires further analysis. Overall, the slower worker speed under single queues or low visibility may result in lower customer satisfaction, but not necessarily. In settings in which customers are not concerned about speed, but, rather, prefer a slower and more-personalized service, the result of server slowdown may be an increase in customer satisfaction. This area of research, as proposed by Bendoly et al. (2010) , requires further investigation.
Appendix

Experimental Instructions
Welcome: "Thank you for your participation today. This task should take 20 minutes. You will earn [X] for your time today. Your responses will be used to do academic research. We appreciate you taking your time and giving this your full consideration." Subjects then create a unique user ID. Consent is confirmed.
Next, subjects are asked to fill out a questionnaire, which includes questions about managerial experience, gender, age, marital status, children, education, time in the United States, and mouse type.
Training: "You will be completing a 2 minute training period on the next screen." Subjects are presented
with the animated training screen. "This is an individual task which will give you practice before you participate in the study task in later screens." "You will be acting as a cashier in a grocery store. Your customers each have five items in their cart. To process a customer's order, slide each bar to match the listed price. Once all items are entered, click submit button to move to the next cart. The "Submit Cart" button will remain inactive until you correctly set all 5 prices. This training period is to ensure you can do the mechanics of the task on your machine. The screen will auto-advance after 2 minutes." Upon completion, subjects verify that training screens loaded. If they do not, they can repeat training.
Task Instructions: Instructions for each treatment follow.
Per Cart treatment: "The training period is complete. The actual task is about to begin. You will earn [rate] for each customer that you successfully submit. Thus if you complete 10 customers, you will earn [bonus] in addition to the [flat payment]. Please indicate that you read the following by correctly answering: If you complete X carts, how much will you earn as a bonus?" Forced response.
Flat treatment: "That completes your training on the software. You will now work a ten minute shift in the grocery store. When the shift is over you will be asked several questions about your experience. " M-Turk: "Then you will receive a completion code to submit to M-Turk to claim payment." Lab: "Then you will get a printed receipt for payment." Parallel: "Reminder, the task will last 10 minutes, and when it is over you will be asked several questions about your experience. You will now be working in a group with 3 other computerized servers. As customers arrive to the checkout area, they choose the line that currently has the fewest customers and wait in that line. Each server has his or her own line."
Single: "Reminder, the task will last 10 minutes, and when it is over you will be asked several questions about your experience. You will now be working in a group with 3 other computerized servers. As customers arrive to the checkout area, they join a single group line and then go to the next available server when their turn comes."
Blocked Visibility: "You can see part, but not all of the line as it wraps behind a fence." All: "You will be awarded your payment upon completion of one 10 minute shift and some short surveys. Please answer the following questions to indicate your understanding" Subjects are presented with an animated sample screen. Next, subjects are asked questions about how the customers wait in line and number of co-workers. Exit Surveys: Subjects were then assessed for questions of self-efficacy, group cohesion and perception, locus-of-control, as well as manipulation checks regarding the number of servers, the type of co-workers (human or computerized), queue structure, items per cart, and their perception of relative speed. Notes: Server's rates of the three computer servers are fixed at ten plus an exponential random variable with mean of ten. The Rate of the fourth server is varied, assuming the same additive structure, to investigate possible effect of the human server with different service speed on the queue length. For example, the rate of 16 in this figure corresponds to ten plus an exponential random variable with mean of six. Single -single (pooled) queue. Parallel -parallel queues. The Utilization variable measures the average utilization of the simulated behavioral agent. (a) Customers arrive according to an exponential random variable with a mean of 5.5. Single queue starts with one customer at each server and eight customers in the pooled queue. Parallel queues start with one customer at each server and three customers in each queue. (b) Customers arrive according to an exponential random variable with a mean of 6.5. Single queue starts with one customer at each server and three customers in the pooled queue. Server's rates of the three computer servers are fixed at ten plus an exponential random variable with a mean of ten. The Rate of the fourth server is also fixed, assuming the same additive structure, at ten plus an exponential random variable with a mean of six. Customers arrive according to an exponential random variable with a mean of 5.5. Parallel -parallel queues. Parallel queues start with one customer at each server and three customers in each queue. The Queue.Length variable for the parallel queues measures the average number of customers in the line in front of the simulated behavioral agent depending on the queue-joining behavior. 
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